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| Mass grave of nazi soldiers killed during the first days of the offensive against the Greek fortresses at "Metaxas Line". Note the date, 8.IV.1941, two days after the start of the invasion. |
On April 6th 1941, the nazi Germans started their offensive against Greece.
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| The nazi German offensive against Greece, April 1941 |
Following the stalemate of their Italian allies in the Albanian front and the victories of the Greeks in the mountainous regions of northern Greece and Albania against the Italian army, since the unprovoked attack of fascist Italy on October 28th, 1940, which signaled the entry of Greece in World War Two, the paranoid German dictator Hitler initiated the preparation for Operation "Marita".
General Ioannis Metaxas, the Greek dictator-prime minister
who died shortly before the German invasion of his country, had initiated
this construction project in the summer of 1936.
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| Only direct artillery hits would silence the bunkers |
Its strongest part extended
over a distance of 200 kilometres (125 miles) from the mouth of the Nestos River to the
point where the Yugoslav, Bulgarian, and Greek borders meet.
The fortresses
within this defense system blocked the road that led through the basin
of Nevrokop and across the Rupel Gorge to eastern Macedonia.
The strength
of the Metaxas Line resided not so much in its fortifications proper as
in the inaccessibility of the intermediate terrain leading up to the defense
positions.
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| Rare photo of the bunkers at Metaxas Line during the fight |
The Greek fortifications along the border had been skillfully adapted
to these terrain features and a defense system in depth covered the few
available roads. No continuous fortifications had been erected along the
Yugoslav-Bulgarian border, but road blocks, demolitions, and extensive
mine fields had been prepared at all border points.
The German plan of attack was based on the premise that, because of
the diversion created by the campaign in Albania, the Greeks would lack
sufficient manpower to defend their borders with Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.
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| Aerial bombardment, mainly by Stukas, of the "Metaxas Line" had minimal effect to the fortifications and the morale of the Greek soldiers |
The frontal attack on the Metaxas Line, undertaken by one German infantry
and two reinforced mountain divisions of the XVIII Mountain Corps, met
with extremely tough resistance from the Greek defenders.
After a three-day
struggle, during which the Germans massed artillery and divebombers, the
Metaxas Line was finally penetrated.
Some of the fortresses of the line held out for days after the German attack
divisions had bypassed them and could not be reduced until heavy guns were
brought up.
The main credit for this achievement
must be given to the 6th Mountain Division, which crossed a 7,000-foot
snow-covered mountain range and broke through at a point that had been
considered inaccessible by the Greeks.
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| Nazis contemplate over the mass grave of 6 of their comrades |
The division reached the rail line
to Salonika on the evening of 7 April and entered Kherson two days later.
By driving armored wedges through the weakest links in the defense chain,
the freedom of maneuver necessary for thrusting deep into enemy territory
could be gained more easily than by moving up the armor only after the
infantry had forced its way through the mountain valleys and defiles.
Once
the weak defense system of southern Yugoslavia had been overrun by German
armor, the relatively strong Metaxas Line, whicl1 obstructed a rapid invasion
of Greece from Bulgaria, could be outflanked by highly mobile forces thrusting
southward from Yugoslavia. Possession of Monastir and the Vardar Valley
leading to Salonika was essential to such an outflanking maneuver.
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| Nazis monitor the mountainous region that was part of the "Metaxas Line" |
When Operation Marita began on 6 April, the bulk of the Greek army was on the border with Albania,
then a protectorate of Fascist Italy, from which the Italian troops
were trying unsuccessfully to enter Greece.
German troops invaded through Bulgaria, creating a second front. Greece had already received a small though inadequate reinforcement from British Empire Forces, in anticipation of the German attack but no more help was sent
after the invasion began.
The Greek army found itself outnumbered in its
effort to defend against both Italian and German troops.
When German troops officially entered Bulgaria during the first four
days of March, the British reacted promptly by embarking an expeditionary
force in Alexandria.
Several squadrons of the Royal Air Force as well as
antiaircraft units had been operating in Greece during the previous months.
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| Nazi assault troops take cover while Ju87s bomb the fortifications |
From the British point of view it was not feasible to desert the Greeks
now that forces were available after the North African victories.
At no
time had the British exercised any pressure on the Greeks by requesting
them to resist the Germans.
On the contrary, Greek leaders had repeatedly
expressed their intention to defend themselves against any German invasion,
no matter whether they would be assisted by their ally or not.
The British
fully realised that their prestige would suffer a crushing blow, if the
expeditionary force had to be evacuated in another Dunkerque, but even
this possibility seemed preferable to leaving Greece to its fate.
In a
report Mr. Eden and his military advisers sent to London at the beginning
of March, they summed up the situation by stating that there was a "reasonable
fighting chance" and, with a certain amount of luck, a good opportunity
"of perhaps seriously upsetting the German plans."
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| Germans take a defensive position on the mountains of northern Greece |
Even so, there
can be no doubt that political factors overshadowed military considerations
in the British decision to send an expeditionary force to Greece.
No definite decision on the disposition of forces was taken, mainly
because of British and Greek hopes that Yugoslavia would join forces against
the Axis Powers.
When this hope finally and somewhat unexpectedly materialized
at the end of March, the three countries failed to establish a unified
command. No such initiative was taken, and there was only one meeting of
British, Yugoslav, and Greek military representatives on 3 April.
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| Newspaper frontpage, dated Sunday April 6, 1941, mentions that at 5:15 this morning the german attack against Greece started. "We will win and we will live free!" |
During
this conference the Yugoslavs promised to block the Strimon Valley in case
of a German attack across their territory. Moreover, the Greeks and Yugoslavs
agreed to launch a common offensive against the Italians in Albania.
By
12 April the Yugoslavs were to concentrate four divisions along the northern
border of Albania and provide additional forces in support of a Greek offensive
in southern Albania.
The course of events demonstrated only too clearly
how unrealistic these offensive plans were at a time when both countries
should have attempted to coordinate their defense efforts against the German
threat.
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| Mountain troops are moving towards their targets |
The assembly area of the German attack forces in southwestern Bulgaria
was delimited by the rugged mountain range along the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border.
In order to enter northern Greece the attacker
had to cross the Rhodope Mountains, where only a few passes and river valleys
permitted the passage of major military units.
Two invasion routes led
across the passes west of Kyustendil along the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border
and another one through the Strimon Valley in the south.
The very steep
mountain roads with their numerous turns could not be negotiated by heavy
vehicles until German engineer troops had widened them by blasting the
rocks. Off the roads only infantry and pack animals could pass through
the terrain.
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| An inside view of the underground tunnel of one of the forts at Metaxas Line |
The Strimon and Nestos
Rivers cut across the mountain range along the Greek-Bulgarian frontier;
both valleys were well protected by strong fortifications which formed
part of the Metaxas Line. This line was a system of concrete pillboxes
and field fortifications, which had been constructed along principles similar
to those applied in the Maginot Line.
Along the Yugoslav-Greek border there is another mountain range with
only two major defiles, one leading from Monastir to Florina, the other
along the Vardar River.
Aside from these mountain ranges bordering Greece
in the north, an aggressor must surmount a number of other alpine and subalpine
mountain ranges barring access to the interior of the country.
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| Germans during a pause of the bitter fighting |
In the west
there are the Pindus Mountains stretching from Albania deep into the interior,
whereas the Olympus and Thermopylae mountain ranges obstruct the eastern
part of the mainland.
Finally, the inaccessible Peloponnesus Mountains
hamper military operations in the southern provinces of Greece.
Troops
are subjected to extreme physical hardships by a campaign across Greece
because habitations are few, water is in short supply, and the weather
is inclement with sudden drops in temperature.
Following the entry of German forces into Bulgaria, most of the Greek
troops were evacuated from western Thrace, which was defended by the Evros
Brigade, a unit consisting of three border guard battalions, when the Germans
launched their attack.
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| One of the bunkers that sustained direct artillery hits |
Adjacent to this unit, in eastern Macedonia, stood
the Nestos Brigade in the area around Xanthi. The Metaxas Line was held
by three infantry divisions, the 7th and 14th east of the Strimon, the
18th west of that river.
The 19th Motorized Infantry Division was in reserve
south of Lake Doirani. Including the fortress garrisons in the Metaxas Line
and some border guard companies, the total strength of the Greek forces
defending the Bulgarian border was roughly 70,000 men. They were under
the command of the Greek Second Army with headquarters in the vicinity
of Salonika.
The Greek forces in central Macedonia consisted of the 12th Infantry
Division, which held the southern part of the Vermion position, and the
20th Infantry Division in the northern sector up to the Yugoslav border.
On 28 March both divisions were brought under the command of General Wilson.
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| The heavy bombardments did not neutralise most of the bunkers |
The bulk of the Greek forces First Army with its fourteen divisions was
committed in Albania.
As a result it was planned that the mobile elements of the XL Panzer
Corps would thrust across the Yugoslav border and capture Skoplje, thereby
cutting the rail and highway communications between Yugoslavia and Greece.
Possession of this strategic point would be decisive for the course of
the entire campaign.
From Skoplje the bulk of the panzer corps was to pivot
southward to Monastir and launch an immediate attack across the Greek border
against the enemy positions established on both sides of Florina. Other
armored elements were to drive westward and make contact with the Italians
along the Albanian border.
The XVIII Mountain Corps was to concentrate its two mountain divisions
on the west wing, make a surprise thrust across the Greek border, and force
the Rupel Gorge. The 2d Panzer Division was to cross Yugoslav territory,
follow the course of the Strimon upstream, turn southward, and drive toward
Salonika.
The XXX Infantry Corps was to reach the Aegean coast by the shortest
route and attack from the east those fortifications of the Metaxas Line
that were situated behind the Nestos.
All three corps were to converge on Salonika. After the capture of that
main city, three panzer and two mountain divisions were to be made available
for the follow-up thrusts toward Athens and the Peloponnesus.
Twelfth Army
headquarters was to coordinate the initially divergent thrusts across southern
Yugoslavia and through Bulgaria into Greece and, during the second phase
of the campaign, drive
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| "Dragons' teeth" were built to hinder the advance of armour |
toward Athens regardless of what happened on the Italian front in Albania.
Actually, the Twelfth Army maneuver would constitute the most effective
assistance that could be given the Italians.
This plan of operations with far-reaching objectives was obviously influenced
by the German experience during the French campaign.
It was based on the
assumption that Yugoslav resistance in front of the XL Panzer Corps would
crumble within a short time under the impact of the German assault.
The
motorized elements would then continue their drive and, taking advantage
of their high degree of mobility, would thrust across the wide gap between
the Greek First and Second Armies long before the Greek command had time
to regroup its forces.
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| Remains of a bunker |
In anticipation of this move the enemy command could
either move up the newly arrived British forces or pull back the Greek
First Army from Albania and form reserves which could block the German
advance from the north. In view of the difficult terrain conditions it
seemed doubtful whether this could be achieved with the necessary speed.
The other XVIII Mountain Corps units advanced step by step under great
hardship. Each individual group of fortifications had to be reduced by
a combination of frontal and enveloping attacks with strong tactical air
support.
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| A recent image of a destroyed bunker - Most of the bunkers were destroyed by the Bulgarian occupation forces, the allies of the nazis, following the capitulation of Greece. During the course of the war and when it became clear that the Germans were losing, the Bulgarians swiftly changed sides and became allies of the Russians. |
The 5th Mountain Division together v ith the reinforced 125th
Infantry Regiment penetrated the Strimon defenses on 7 April and, attacking
along both banks of the river, cleaned out one bunker after another. After
repelling several counterattacks the division reached Neon Petritsi, thus
gaining access to the Rupul Gorge from the south.
The 125th Infantry Regiment,
which was attacking the gorge from the north, suffered such heavy casualties that
it had to be withdrawn from further action after it had reached its objective.
The 72d Infantry Division, which advanced from Nevrokopi across the mountains,
was handicapped by a shortage of pack animals, medium artillery, and mountain
equipment.
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| A downed aircraft, possibly somewhere near the Metaxas Line |
